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Abstract:	 Fiscal	 rules	have	become	popular	 to	 limit	 deficits	 and	high	debt	burdens	 in	
industrialized	countries.	A	growing	literature	examines	their	impact	based	on	aggregate	
fiscal	performance.	So	far,	no	evidence	exists	on	how	fiscal	rules	influence	deficit	expec‐






pliance	 expectations	 in	 the	 survey	 closely	 corresponds	 to	 our	 theoretical	 predictions	
regarding	 states’	 initial	 fiscal	 conditions,	 specific	 state	 fiscal	 rules	 and	 bailout	 percep‐
tions.	In	addition,	there	is	a	robust	asymmetry	in	compliance	expectations	between	in‐
siders	and	outsiders	(both	for	in‐state	vs	out‐of‐state	politicians	and	the	government	vs	
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Constitutional	 fiscal	 rules	 such	 as	 a	 balanced	 budget	 requirement	 have	 been	 used	 for	
decades	in	federal	countries	such	as	Switzerland	and	the	US	states	to	limit	deficits	and	
debts	of	sub‐national	jurisdictions	(for	a	survey	of	current	fiscal	rules	see	IMF,	2012).	On	








A	growing	 literature	examines	the	 impact	of	numerical	 fiscal	rules	based	on	aggregate	
fiscal	performance	in	different	regional	contexts.	The	standard	approach	is	the	estima‐
tion	of	 cross‐section	or	panel	models	 for	 the	 selected	 jurisdictions	and	 their	deficit	or	
debt	performance	 (for	 the	US	 see	Eichengreen	and	Bayoumi,	1994,	Poterba,	1996;	 for	
Europe	 see	Debrun,	2000,	Lagona	and	Padovano,	2007,	Debrun	et	 al.,	 2008;	 for	OECD	
countries	see	Dahan	and	Strawczynski,	2010;	and	for	Swiss	cantons	and	municipalities	
see	 Feld	 and	Kirchgässner,	 2008;	Krogstrup	 and	Wälti,	 2008).	A	 shortcoming	of	 these	
highly	aggregated	approaches	is	that	they	do	not	reveal	how	fiscal	rules	impact	on	the	





consistent	 with	 the	 rule’s	 constraints.	 This	 logic	 has	 long	 been	 the	 key	 for	 assessing	
monetary	rules.	 In	 the	monetary	context,	 incentives	to	generate	surprise	 inflation	may	























tion	 formation	 for	 the	members	of	 all	German	 state	parliaments	 regarding	an	existing	




pact	are	 similar	 to	 that	of	Germany’s	debt	brake.	Therefore,	a	better	understanding	of	
the	German	debt	brake	will	also	be	helpful	for	assessing	the	Compact’s	consequences	for	












the	dynamic	 fiscal	 decision	 situation	 in	 an	 environment	 characterized	by	phasing	 in	 a	
zero	deficit	 rule.	Decisions	on	deficits	 are	dynamic	by	nature	and	 imply	 trade‐offs	be‐





deficit	 in	period	0	 ,	 the	higher	 is	the	government’s	competence	 in	smoothing	the	 fiscal	
shock	,	the	lower	are	bailout	expectations	,	the	tighter	is	a	fiscal	rule	at	the	state	level	in	
period	1,	and	the	higher	 the	deficit	 reduction	 in	period	0.	The	model	also	allows	us	 to	





tions	 based	 on	 a	 unique	 survey	 of	members	 of	 all	 16	 German	 state	 parliaments,	who	
have	been	contacted	with	a	questionnaire	relating	to	the	new	debt	brake.	In	the	survey	
we	elicited	responses	for	the	politicians’	expectations	on	the	own	state	complying	with	
the	 new	 rule	 by	 the	 year	 2020,	 on	 other	 states’	 compliance,	 and	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	






tions.	 States’	 initial	 fiscal	 conditions,	 specific	 state	 fiscal	 rules	 and	bailout	 perceptions	
matter.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 a	 robust	 asymmetry	 in	 compliance	 expectations	 between	
insiders	and	outsiders	(both	for	in‐state	versus	out‐of‐state	politicians	and	the	govern‐
ment	 versus	 opposition	 dimension).	 Insiders	 tend	 to	 be	 significantly	 more	 optimistic	
than	outsiders	regarding	the	likelihood	of	state’s	compliance.	Based	on	the	guidance	of	





results	point	 to	 the	 importance	of	no‐bailout	 rules,	 sustainable	 initial	 fiscal	 conditions	
and	complementary	sub‐national	rules.	
Our	paper	is	related	to	various	other	literatures.	A	few	recent	papers	analyze	theoreti‐
cally	 the	 role	 of	 fiscal	 rules	 in	 a	 political	 economy	 framework,	 such	 as	 Azzimonti,	
Battaglini	and	Coate	(2008).	Janeba	(2012)	considers	the	role	of	delay	in	making	a	Ger‐
































0),	 the	government	obtains	payoff	ݑ௖	 (c	 for	compliance).	Otherwise	 the	government	 is	

























݀ଵ ൌ ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏ.																																	 	 	 (1)	
In	period	1	the	government	reduces	the	deficit	further	by	choosing	r1	so	that		





ܷ ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜሾݒ െ ܿሺݎଵሻሿ,	 	 	 	 	 (3)	





government	must	comply	with	 it	 regardless	of	 the	realization	of	 the	shock	 in	period	1	
Therefore	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 period	 1	 is	 ݎଵ ൌ ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏ.	 The	 expected	 utility	 from	
compliance	is	then	
				ܧሾܷሿ ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቂݑ௖ െ ଵௌ ׬ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏሻ
ௌ
଴ ݀ݏቃ,	 	 (4)	






found	by	maximizing	 (4)	with	 respect	 to	 r0.	The	optimum	ݎ଴෥ 	is	 implicitly	 given	by	 the	
condition		 	





cost	ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴෥ ൅ ݍܵሻ െ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴෥ሻ.			
Inserting	the	optimal	value	ݎ଴෥ 	into	(4)	gives	the	maximal	utility	from	compliance		with	a	
credible	deficit	rule	and	is	denoted	ܷ௖௖ሺݎ଴෥ሻ.	 	We	like	to	note	that	there	is	no	guarantee	
                                                 
1 We could discount utility in period 2 by ߜଶ instead of ߜ.  Doing so would simply rescale the utility level v, 











analyze	 the	 conditions	 under	which	 it	 is	 in	 the	 government’s	 interest	 to	 (not)	 comply	
with	the	fiscal	target,	and	if	so,	how	the	deficit	reduction	is	distributed	over	time.	For	the	
time	being	we	focus	on	the	political	decision	maker	and	her	interest	in	compliance.	Later	






ernment	competence	q,	possible	bailout	expectations,	 as	well	 as	additional	 fiscal	 rules	
restricting	the	maximum	deficit	level	in	period	1	(prior	to	the	existing	fiscal	rule	in	peri‐
od	2).	The	lack	of	commitment	requires	that	we	solve	the	model	by	backward	induction.	








	 	 	 ܿሺ݀ଵሻ ൑ ݑ ൌ ݑ௖ െ ݑ௡௖,	 	 	 	 (6)	






ernment	will	 choose	 to	be	 compliant,	 otherwise	not.	Using	 (1),	 the	 threshold	 level	de‐
fines	implicitly	a	maximum	level	of	the	deficit	shock	s,	called	s*,	that	is	consistent	with	d2	
=	0.	The	critical	level	is	given	by		
	 	 ݏ∗ ൌ ௗభ∗ା௥బିௗబ௤ ൌ
௖షభሺ௨ሻା௥బିௗబ
௤ .	 	 	 	 (7)	










	 	 	 ݌ ൌ ௦∗ௌ ൌ
௖షభሺ௨ሻା௥బିௗబ














                                                 
2 First, we assume that ܿିଵሺݑሻ ൒ ݀଴, which is sufficient to make s* in (7) nonnegative (because we assume r0 ≥ 
0). The condition holds, if the initial deficit is not too large relative to the gross gain of compliance. Second, we 
assume that the maximally possible shock S is sufficiently large so that s* ≤ S always holds. This assumption 





fore	 affects	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance	 via	 (9).	 From	 the	 incumbent	 government’s	
view	in	period	0	the	utility	is	uncertain	due	to	the	shock	s.	The	expected	payoff	is			
ܧሾܷሿ ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜܵ ቎නሺݑ௖ െ
௦∗
଴




	ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቂݑ௡௖ ൅ ݌ݑ െ ଵௌ ׬ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏሻ
௦∗
଴ ݀ݏቃ	 (10)	






expected	 gross	 gain	 from	 compliance,	minus	 the	 cost	 of	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 period	 1	
when	s	is	sufficiently	small	(s<s*).	






ᇱሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቎ݑ ݀݌݀ݎ଴ െ
1
ܵන








	 	 			 ൌ െܿᇱሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቂ௨ି௖ሺௗబି௥బሻ௤ௌ ቃ	 	 	 	 (11)	
Derivative	(11)	has	the	following	interpretation:	An	increase	in	r0	increases	the	marginal	
cost	of	deficit	 reduction	 in	 the	 current	period.	The	marginal	benefit	 of	doing	 so	 is	 the	
discounted	 increase	 in	 the	 expected	 gross	 gain	 of	 compliance	 (due	 to	 the	 increase	 in	
probability	of	compliance)	adjusted	for	the	cost	of	reducing	the	deficit	by	d0	‐	r0.	Recall	
                                                 
3 This assumes implicitly that d1 >0, which holds, if r0<d0.  
10 
 








of	 compliance	 (1/(qS))	weighted	by	 the	gross	gain	u.	We	assume	c’(d0)	>	 	 δu/(qS),	 so	
that	dE[U]/dr0	<	0	at	r0	=	d0.		Thus	a	local	maximum	must	obtain	in	the	interval	between	
0	and	d0.	The	optimal	 level	of	 first	period	deficit	 reduction	 ̂ݎ଴	 is	 found	by	 setting	 (11)	
equal	to	zero,	which	gives			




௤ௌ ൏ 0.	 	 	 	 (13)		
	
2.3	Results	






1.	 Initial	 deficit:	 Differentiation	 of	 (12)	 shows	 that	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 initial	 deficit	 d0	
leads	to	a	lower	government	effort	in	initial	deficit	reduction,	that	is		
	 	 	 డ௥̂బడௗబ ൌ
௖ᇲሺௗబି௥̂బሻ
ሾఋ௖ᇲሺௗబି௥̂బሻି௤ௌ௖ᇲᇲሺ௥̂బሻሿ ൏ 0,	 	 	 (14)	
                                                 
4 The difference between the optimal deficit reduction under credible and non-credible fiscal rules is twofold. 
First, the utility gain from compliance u appears in (11) but not in (5) because with a credible rule the govern-
ment always obtains uc. Second, the marginal benefit of extending r0 does not contain the cost term c(d1) in (11) 
because an increase in r0 reduces the cost of deficit reduction for given probability of compliance (p or s* in 













2.	Bailout	expectations:	 Up	 to	 now	we	did	not	 explicitly	 address	 the	 role	 of	 a	 possible	
bailout	in	case	of	non‐compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule.	Rather	we	assigned	a	utility	level	
for	the	case	of	non‐compliance,	assuming	it	to	be	lower	than	in	case	of	compliance.	Sup‐
pose	now	 that	 a	 bailout	 is	 possible	 but	 less	 than	 certain	 (so	non‐compliance	 is	worse	






	 	 	 డ௥̂బడ௨ ൌ
ିଵ
ሾఋ௖ᇱሺௗబି௥̂బሻି௤ௌ௖ᇲᇲሺ௥̂బሻሿ ൐ 0,	 	 	 (16)	
thus	lowering	the	effort	in	initial	deficit	reduction.	Moreover,	a	higher	bailout	utility	re‐
duces	 the	probability	of	 compliance	because	a	decrease	 in	u	decreases	p	both	directly	
and	indirectly:		
	 	 	 డ௣డ௨ ൌ
ଵ
௤ௌ ቀܿିଵ




3.	State	 fiscal	rule	 in	period	1:	The	 fiscal	rule	under	consideration	becomes	effective	 in	
period	2.	Some	states	in	Germany	have	introduced	fiscal	rules	at	the	state	level	with	con‐
straints	becoming	effective	prior	 to	 the	national	debt	brake’s	crucial	year	2020.	These	
state	 rules	 are	 supposed	 to	 strengthen	 the	 effort	 and	 likelihood	 of	 compliance.	 In	 the	





for	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 fiscal	 rule	 may	 be	 of	 different	 strictness.	 We	 express	 the	
strictness	 in	 terms	of	 the	maximum	 feasible	deficit	 that	 can	occur	 in	period	1,	d0	+qS.	
The	upper	limit	of	the	deficit	in	period	1	must	obey		 	




















sion	 on	period	0	 deficit	 reduction	has	 been	 taken	but	 before	 the	 shock	 s	 realizes.	We	
thus	 focus	 on	 the	 expectations	 at	 an	 interim	 stage	 for	 a	 given	 level	 of	 r0.	We	wish	 to	




of	 individuals	 (more	 than	 half)	 believe	 to	 perform	 better	 than	 the	 average/median,	
13 
 
which	 is	 impossible.	 This	 is	 termed	 overconfidence.	 In	 the	 present	 context	 this	 could	
mean	 that	 the	 incumbent	government	believes	 its	 competency	 to	be	higher	 than	what	
the	opposition	asserts,	that	is,	the	government	believes	to	have	a	lower	value	of	q	than	
what	 the	opposition	 thinks	 this	value	 to	be.	This	assumption	does	not	require	a	state‐
ment	about	 the	 true	competence,	only	 that	 the	 two	beliefs	differ.	Equation	(8)	 implies	




	 	 	 డ௥̂బడ௤ ൌ
ௌ௖ᇲሺ௥̂బሻ
ሾఋ௖ᇱሺௗబି௥̂బሻି௤ௌ௖ᇲᇲሺ௥̂బሻሿ ൏ 0,	 	 	 (20)	
which	 is	 negative	 by	 the	 second	 order	 condition.	 The	 incumbent	 government	 is	more	
optimistic	about	the	likelihood	of	compliance	in	period	1	and	thus	undertakes	more	ef‐
fort	in	period	0,	which	in	turn	makes	compliance	more	likely.		
Alternatively,	we	may	assume	that	 insiders	(which	may	be	 the	 incumbent	government	
or	 in‐state	 legislators)	 know	 the	 government’s	 competence	 exactly,	 denoted	 by	 q,	 but	
outsiders	 (which	may	 be	 the	 opposition	 or	 out‐of‐state	 politicians)	 have	 only	 a	 noisy	
signal	 about	 the	 government’s	 competence.	 Specifically,	we	 assume	 that	 outsiders	 be‐
lieve	 that	 government	 competence	 is	 ql	with	probability	 z	 and	qh	with	probability	1‐z	
such	that	E[q]	=	zql	+	(1‐z)qh	=	q.	The	expected	value	of	the	outsiders’	subjective	belief	of	




	 	 	 ݌௜௡௦ ൌ ௖షభሺ௨ሻା௥బିௗబ௤ௌ .		 	 	 	 	 (21)	
By	contrast,	the	outsider’s	expected	likelihood	of	compliance	by	the	government	is		
	 	 ݌௢௢௧ ൌ ݖ ቂ௖షభሺ௨ሻା௥బିௗబ௤೗ௌ ቃ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݖሻ ቂ
௖షభሺ௨ሻା௥బିௗబ
௤೓ௌ ቃ	 	 (22)	 							
	 	 ൌ ݌௜௡௦ݍ ቂ ௭௤೗ ൅
ሺଵି௭ሻ

































Social	Democratic	 Party	 (SPD)	 is	 the	 other	major	 party	 and	 represents	 the	 center‐left	
(less	market	oriented	than	the	Christian	Democrats,	socially	progressive	and	in	favor	of	
more	 intense	 redistribution	 than	 CDU/CSU).	 The	 Free	 Democratic	 Party	 (FDP)	 is	 the	









lapping	 areas	 of	 policy	 responsibility:	 (1)	 the	 federal	 level,	 (2)	 the	 states,	 and	 (3)	 the	
municipal	level.	Tax	autonomy	at	the	state	level	is	relatively	low.	Revenues	are	equalized	
to	a	significant	degree	across	states	and	in	addition	through	vertical	tax	sharing.		Differ‐
ences	 in	 state	 revenues	per	capita	are	 reduced	via	a	 fiscal	equalization	system,	whose	
legal	foundation	is	set	in	Article	106	of	the	German	constitution	(Grundgesetz),	accord‐
ing	 to	 which	 material	 living	 conditions	 should	 be	 comparable	 across	 German	 states.	
Through	the	large	degree	of	revenue	sharing	the	German	federal	system	is	closer	to	be‐
ing	 an	 example	 of	 cooperative	 fiscal	 federalism	 rather	 than	 competitive	 federalism	
(Braun,	 2007;	 for	 details	 on	 equalization	 and	 tax	 sharing	 see	 also	 Heinemann	 et	 al.,	
2013).		
Fiscal	Rules.	The	fiscal	rule	is	the	German	debt	brake	(“Schuldenbremse”),	which	became	
part	 of	 the	German	 constitution	 (the	 “Grundgesetz”)	 in	 2009.	 It	was	motivated	 by	 the	
continuing	buildup	of	public	debt	across	all	 	levels	of	government	since	the	1970s.	The	
new	 constitutional	 rule	 requires	 the	 federal	 government	 to	 run	 a	 (cyclically	 adjusted)	
budget	deficit	of	no	more	than	0.35%	of	GDP	starting	in	2016	(see	Bundesministerium	






states	 (Berlin,	Bremen,	 Saarland,	 Saxony‐Anhalt	und	Schleswig‐Holstein)	 receive	 “con‐
solidation	aids”	in	total	of	€800	million	annually	until	2019.	In	return	they	are	required	
to	reduce	their	2010	budget	deficit	 in	equal	steps	until	2020.	As	a	reaction	to	the	new	







ministers	 for	 finance	and	economics	as	well	as	all	 state	 finance	ministers.	The	Council	
has	relatively	little	power	to	enforce	fiscal	rules	and	improve	fiscal	performance	because	
it	is	not	allowed	to	impose	monetary	sanctions	directly.		In	the	case	of	the	five	states	re‐




Economic	 Performance.	 The	 lack	 of	 comprehensive	 monetary	 sanctions	 and	 the	 long	
transitory	period	raise	serious	questions	about	the	new	rule’s	credibility.	In	addition,	the	
highly	 diverse	 fiscal	 situation	 of	 states	 feeds	 diverging	 expectations.	 Table	 1	 provides	
information	on	key	indicators	and	shows	the	large	difference	in	economic	activity.	GDP	
per	capita	in	Hamburg,	for	example,	is	more	than	twice	as	large	as	in	most	eastern	states.	
Debt	 to	 state	 GDP	 is	 particularly	 high	 for	 the	 city	 states	 of	 Berlin	 and	 Bremen	 (both	
above	60%).	Often	high	debt	 levels	go	hand	 in	hand	with	 large	projected	 fiscal	adjust‐
ments,	as	identified	by	the	German	Council	of	Economic	Advisors’	calculation	of	consoli‐
dation	 need	 (an	 index	 ranging	 from	 ‐0.6	 +3.5,	where	Berlin	 and	Bremen	 are	 near	 the	
maximum).	In	the	light	of	these	fiscal	performances	it	is	somewhat	surprising	that	credit	






































	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Federal	
Government	
81.84	 44.02	 49.79e	 ‐	 AAAd,e	 	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Baden‐
Württemberg	 10.79	 34.89	 17.16	 0.10	 AAAd		 0.62	
Bavaria	 12.60	 35.44	 6.79	 ‐0.60	 AAAd		 0.48	
Berlin	 3.50	 28.95	 61.64	 3.50	 Aa1c	 0.65	
Brandenburg	 2.50	 22.08	 35.77	 2.10	 Aa1c	 0.51	
Bremen	 0.66	 42.39	 73.63	 3.40	 ‐	 0.64	
Hamburg	 1.80	 52.49	 26.86	 0.30	 ‐	 0.47	
Hesse	 6.09	 37.51	 17.28	 1.30	 AAd	 0.50	
Mecklenburg‐
West	Pomerania	 1.63	 21.40	 29.11	 1.70	 ‐	 0.46	
Lower	Saxony	 7.91	 28.35	 25.42	 1.30	 ‐	 0.55	
North	Rhine‐
Westphalia	 17.84	 31.88	 33.22	 1.60	 AA‐d	 0.45	
Rhineland‐
Palatinate	 4.00	 28.31	 32.49	 1.80	 AAAb	 0.69	
Saarland	 1.01	 30.10	 41.83	 2.80	 ‐	 0.70	
Saxony	 4.14	 22.98	 9.99	 0.60	 AAAd	 0.76	
Saxony‐Anhalt	 2.31	 22.43	 39.84	 2.50	 AA+d	 0.77	
Schleswig‐
Holstein	 2.84	 25.95	 38.57	 1.30	 AAAb	 0.77	
Thuringia	 2.22	 21.66	 35.04	 2.30	 AAAb	 0.66	
Notes:	 a	 from	 http://www.welt.de/finanzen/article107267058/Bundeslaender‐profitieren‐von‐Deutschland‐Bonds.html	
last	access	on	23	July	2013;	b	Fitch;	c	Moody’s;	d	S&P,	e	referring	to	federal	level	alone,	not	to	aggregate	for	Germany.	Need	















of	14	months	 in	2011	and	2012.	We	conducted	 the	 survey	 in	 three	waves	 in	order	 to	
make	sure	that	it	did	not	collide	with	election	times	(surveys	were	conducted	approxi‐




















	 	 	 	 	 	
Overall	 1861	 639	 34.34%	 	 	
		 	 	 	 	 	
Baden‐Württemberg	 138	 77	 55.80%	 3	 3/2011	
Bavaria	 187	 75	 40.11%	 1	 9/2008	
Berlin	 149	 30	 20.13%	 3	 9/2011	
Brandenburg	 88	 19	 21.59%	 1	 9/2009	
Bremen	 83	 18	 21.69%	 3	 5/2011	
Hamburg	 124	 39	 31.45%	 2	 2/2011	
Hesse	 114	 50	 43.86%	 2	 1/2009	
Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	 71	 17	 23.94%	 3	 9/2011	
Lower	Saxony	 152	 54	 35.53%	 1	 1/2008	
North	Rhine‐Westphalia	 181	 51	 28.18%	 2	 5/2010	
Rhineland‐Palatinate	 101	 50	 49.50%	 3	 3/2011	
Saarland	 51	 20	 39.22%	 1	 8/2009	
Saxony	 133	 45	 33.83%	 2	 8/2009	
Saxony‐Anhalt	 106	 47	 44.79%	 2	 3/2011	
Schleswig‐Holstein	 95	 29	 30.53%	 1	 9/2009	




























o There	 will	 be	 sanctions	 against	 non‐complying	 states,	 e.g.,	 lower	 transfers	 within	 the	
federal	fiscal	equalization	scheme	








pliance	 (85%	believe	 it	 is	 highly	 probable)	 the	 prospects	 of	 the	 city	 states	 of	Bremen	
(3%)	 and	 Berlin	 (4%)	 are	 highly	 pessimistic.	 These	 expectations	 obviously	 correlate	
closely	with	 current	 consolidation	 needs	 and	 debt	 levels	 (see	 Table	 1).	 In	 addition,	 a	
strong	asymmetry	emerges	for	insider/outsider	expectations	on	financially	weak	states	






firms	 this	 asymmetry	 in	 general).	 Figure	 3	 summarizes	 the	 results	 for	 the	 non‐
compliance	 question:	 For	 this	 scenario,	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 politicians	 expect	 a	
strong	role	of	constitutional	courts	(both	from	federal	and	state	level)	to	enforce	consol‐
idation	 or	 sanction.	 However,	 a	 large	 fraction	 of	 politicians	 expect	 the	 government	
budget	 constraint	 to	 be	 soft	 due	 to	 bailout‐transfers	 or	 a	 relaxation	 of	 the	 strict	 debt	
brake.	Overall,	these	descriptive	findings	point	to	the	possible	relevance	of	our	model’s	
prediction	on	the	role	of	the	initial	fiscal	situation,	bailout	expectations	or	the	expected	
asymmetry	 between	 insiders	 and	 outsiders.	We	 substantiate	 the	model’s	 explanatory	
power	in	the	subsequent	regression	analysis.	
 
Figure 1: Compliance across states 
	BB=Brandenburg,	 BE=Berlin,	 BW=Baden‐Württemberg,	 BY=Bavaria,	 HB=Bremen,	
HE=Hesse,	 HH=Hamburg,	 MV=Mecklenburg‐West	 Pomerania,	 NI=Lower	 Saxony,	 NW=	









BB=Brandenburg,	 BE=Berlin,	 BW=Baden‐Württemberg,	 BY=Bavaria,	 HB=Bremen,	
HE=Hesse,	 HH=Hamburg,	 MV=Mecklenburg‐West	 Pomerania,	 NI=Lower	 Saxony,	 NW=	













Our	 database	 is	 sufficiently	 rich	 to	 test	 whether	 the	 predictions	 from	 our	 theoretical	




















Heinemann	 (2013)	who	 develop	 an	 index	 for	 the	 stringency	 of	 German	 individual	
states’	fiscal	rules,	which	takes	account	of	the	rule’s	contents	and	precision,	legal	ba‐
sis	and	enforcement.	
- The	 insider‐outsider‐differentiation	 (H4)	 has	 two	dimensions:	 First,	we	 can	distin‐
guish	 between	 incumbents	 as	 insiders	 and	 all	 others,	where	 “incumbents”	 are	 de‐
fined	as	members	of	one	of	the	governing	parties	in	the	respective	state.	Second,	we	
                                                 
5 Indicator construction is as follows: We add one point if a politician expects one of the “tough” reactions to a 
state non-complying (i.e. “enforcement through constitutional courts”, “sanctions”, “intervention in budget au-
tonomy” or “merger of states”) and subtract one point for each of these reactions which is not expected. Analo-
gously, we subtract one point for each of the expected “soft” reactions to a state-non complying (i.e. “change of 





We	enrich	 this	 theory‐guided	choice	of	variables	 through	the	 inclusion	of	 further	 indi‐
vidual	 and	 state	 controls	 because	 a	 growing	 empirical	 literature	 points	 to	 the	 im‐
portance	of	these	variables	for	economic,	monetary	and	fiscal	performance	(Besley	et	al.,	
2011,	 Göhlmann	 and	 Vaubel,	 2007,	Moessinger,	 2014).	We	 take	 account	 of	 the	 politi‐






























ations	of	 the	 fiscal	rule	(lower	 index	 for	strength	of	budget	constraint)	 lowers	compli‐
ance	expectations.	A	stricter	state‐individual	fiscal	rule	is	correlated	with	a	more	favora‐
ble	view	for	this	particular	state.	The	size	of	the	effects	is	substantial	judged	on	the	basis	
of	 average	marginal	 effects:	A	one	percentage	point	 increase	of	 a	 state’s	 consolidation	
need	(H1)	lowers	the	probability	that	this	state	is	expected	to	be	compliant	by	about	10	
percentage	points.	The	difference	between	a	very	soft	 (‐7)	and	very	hard	(+7)	percep‐
tion	of	 the	budget	constraint	 (H2)	amounts	 to	an	 impact	of	24	percentage	points.	And	
the	difference	 between	 the	weakest	 (0.45)	 and	 strongest	 (0.78)	 observable	 state	 debt	
rule	(H3)	is	associated	with	a	probability	increase	of	16	percentage	points	that	a	state	is	
predicted	to	comply.6	H4‐related	proxies	are	highly	significant	for	both	insider‐outsider‐
dimensions:	 Insiders	 (members	 of	 parties	 who	 form	 a	 state’s	 government/in‐state‐
politicians)	are	more	optimistic	than	outsiders	(members	of	opposition	parties/out‐of‐
state‐MSPs).	 The	 size	 of	 the	 effect	 is	 much	 larger	 for	 the	 in‐state	 vs.	 out‐of‐state‐
dimension	 (21	 percentage	 points)	 than	 for	 the	 government‐opposition‐distinction	 (4	
percentage	points).	In	the	light	of	our	theory,	the	positive	sign	of	insider	status	points	to	
the	 role	 of	 overconfidence	 as	 driving	 insider‐outsider‐asymmetry.	 If	 outsiders	 had	 an	
information	disadvantage	 they	 should	 sometimes	 over‐	 and	 sometimes	underestimate	
the	competence	of	insiders	but	not	necessarily	be	systematically	more	pessimistic	than	
insiders.	 Therefore,	 the	 systematically	 larger	 optimism	 of	 insiders	 is	 consistent	 with	
over‐confidence	rather	than	with	noisy	information.		
The	other	control	variables	are	 important	 to	understand	the	heterogeneity	of	expecta‐







                                                 




trum	 (i.e.	 between	 the	market‐liberal	 FDP	 and	 the	 socialist	 Left	 Party).7	 States	with	 a	
government	 consisting	 of	 right	 parties	 (i.e.	 Christian	Democrats	 and/or	 FDP)	 are	 per‐
ceived	to	have	a	higher	chance	of	compliance.	Consolidation	aid	does	not	seem	to	com‐
pensate	 for	 the	 less	 favorable	economic	and	 fiscal	 conditions	of	 the	 five	 related	 states	
since	the	related	dummy	is	significantly	negative.		
We	employ	various	model	variants:	In	column	(2)	we	allow	for	individual	fixed	effects.8	
This	specification	accounts	 for	 the	risk	 that	unobserved	 individual	characteristics	may	
bias	 the	 results	 for	 state	 indicators.	 No	 substantial	 differences	 emerge.	 Table	 4	 takes	
account	of	the	spatial	dimension	of	our	cross‐state	analysis.	 In	particular,	we	allow	for	
more	differentiated	information	asymmetries	across	states.	For	that	purpose,	we	include	















are	confirmed	(see	Table	A3	 in	 the	Appendix).	 Just	 like	 the	need	 for	 consolidation	 the	
debt	 stock	 and	 the	 average	 deficit	 enter	 highly	 significantly	 and	with	 a	 negative	 sign.	
Higher	debt	or	deficits	also	decrease	the	compliance	expectations	of	legislators.	The	im‐
pact	of	almost	all	other	variables	remains	as	in	the	baseline	regressions.	The	coefficient	
for	 GDP	 per	 capita	 becomes	 significant,	 thereby	 providing	 additional	 evidence	 for	 the	
                                                 
7 Weighted regressions, however, indicate that Left Party politicians are more confident that the debt brake will 
be respected than politicians from the FDP, see below section 4.2. 






ance.	 Only	 the	 coefficients	 to	 the	 fiscal	 equalization	 transfers	 change	 significance	 and	
signs	across	specifications.	We	belief	 that	this	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	debt	 is	









gender.	Thus,	 our	 regressions	 comprise	 as	 controls	 those	 factors	which	are	 important	
drivers	 of	 non‐response.	 This	 greatly	 reduces	 the	 potential	 for	 selection	 bias.	 Yet,	we	
cannot	 fully	 exclude	 that	 we	 might	 still	 have	 a	 selection	 bias	 (Little	 and	 Vartivarian,	
2005).	As	a	 further	robustness	check,	we	therefore	employ	a	weighted	regression	(see	
Table	A4	 in	 the	appendix).	For	 the	weighting,	we	use	 the	 inverse	response	probability	
based	on	party	and	state	affiliation.	The	weighted	regression	slightly	changes	the	find‐
ings	 for	 party	 dummies:	 The	 Social	 Democrats	 dummy	 loses	 significance	whereas	 the	
difference	between	the	Left	Party	and	the	Free	Democrats	now	becomes	significant.	In‐
terestingly,	 in	 this	 regression	variant	 left‐	 leaning	politicians	are	more	optimistic	 than	





                                                 
9 The correlation coefficient amounts to 0.76. 
10 We do not face severe item non-response but predominantly unit non-response. Item non-response amounts to 














Tertiary	degree	 0.020 0.006	 	
[0.035]	 [0.009]	 	 	
Economics/Business	degree 0.040 0.011	 	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Individual:	parliamentary	role 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.149*** 0.040***	 	
[0.046]	 [0.013]	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee ‐0.150*** ‐0.041***	 	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.006** ‐0.002**	 	
[0.002]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	other	 	
Female	 ‐0.106*** ‐0.029***	 	
[0.032]	 [0.009]	 	 	
Age	in	years	 0.002* 0.001*	 	
[0.001]	 [0.000]	 	 	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2) 0.063*** 0.017***	 	
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.112 ‐0.030	 	
[0.068]	 [0.019]	 	 	
SPD	 ‐0.181** ‐0.049**	 	
	 [0.074]	 [0.020]	 	 	
Green	Party	 0.050 0.013	 	
	 [0.087]	 [0.024]	 	 	
Left	Party	 0.109 0.030	 	
[0.084]	 [0.023]	 	 	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.109 ‐0.030	 	
[0.125]	 [0.034]	 	 	
State	characteristicsb	 	
GDP	per	capita	(H1)	 0.007 0.002	 0.005	 0.001
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.007]	 [0.001]	
Need	for	consolidation	(H1)	 ‐0.386*** ‐0.105***	 ‐0.541***	 ‐0.098***
	 [0.048]	 [0.013]	 [0.063]	 [0.011]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 1.860*** 0.506***	 2.736***	 0.497***
	 [0.292]	 [0.079]	 [0.398]	 [0.072]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.767*** ‐0.209***	 ‐1.220***	 ‐0.222***
[0.110]	 [0.030]	 [0.147]	 [0.027]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 ‐0.067 ‐0.018	 ‐0.151**	 ‐0.027**
	 [0.047]	 [0.013]	 [0.070]	 [0.013]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.605*** 0.165***	 0.870***	 0.158***
[0.074]	 [0.020]	 [0.103]	 [0.018]	
Cross	state	dimension:	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.759*** 0.207***	 1.121***	 0.204***
	 [0.104]	 [0.028]	 [0.169]	 [0.030]	
Distance	 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐	 ‐‐
	 	 	 	 	
Adjacency	 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐	 ‐‐
	 	 	 	 	



























Tertiary	degree	 0.021 0.006	 	
[0.035]	 [0.009]	 	 	
Economics/Business	degree 0.039 0.011	 	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Individual:	parliamentary	role 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.148*** 0.040***	 	
[0.046]	 [0.012]	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee ‐0.150*** ‐0.041***	 	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.006** ‐0.002**	 	
	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	other	 	
Female	 ‐0.105*** ‐0.029***	 	
[0.032]	 [0.009]	 	 	
Age	in	years	 0.002* 0.001*	 	
[0.001]	 [0.000]	 	 	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2) 0.063*** 0.017***	 	
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.112 ‐0.030	 	
[0.069]	 [0.019]	 	 	
SPD	 ‐0.181** ‐0.049**	 	
	 [0.074]	 [0.020]	 	 	
Green	Party	 0.050 0.014	 	
	 [0.087]	 [0.024]	 	 	
Left	Party	 0.108 0.029	 	
[0.084]	 [0.023]	 	 	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.107 ‐0.029	 	
[0.126]	 [0.034]	 	 	
State	characteristicsb	 	
GDP	per	capita	(H1)	 0.007 0.002	 0.005	 0.001
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.007]	 [0.001]	
Need	for	consolidation	(H1)	 ‐0.408*** ‐0.111***	 ‐0.572***	 ‐0.103***
	 [0.048]	 [0.013]	 [0.064]	 [0.011]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 1.806*** 0.491***	 2.683***	 0.485***
	 [0.286]	 [0.078]	 [0.393]	 [0.071]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.723*** ‐0.196***	 ‐1.166***	 ‐0.211***
[0.112]	 [0.030]	 [0.150]	 [0.028]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 ‐0.045 ‐0.012	 ‐0.116*	 ‐0.021*
	 [0.046]	 [0.012]	 [0.069]	 [0.012]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.582*** 0.158***	 0.838***	 0.151***
[0.071]	 [0.019]	 [0.099]	 [0.017]	
Cross	state	dimension	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.621*** 0.169***	 0.940***	 0.170***
	 [0.129]	 [0.035]	 [0.197]	 [0.036]	
Distance	 ‐0.014 ‐0.004	 ‐0.010	 ‐0.002
	 [0.026]	 [0.007]	 [0.037]	 [0.007]	
Adjacency	 0.133 0.036	 0.217*	 0.039*
	 [0.083]	 [0.022]	 [0.119]	 [0.021]	























holds	 both	 for	 the	 government	 versus	 opposition	 and	 the	 in‐state	 versus	 out‐of‐state	
dimension.	This	result	might	be	considered	unproblematic,	if	the	governing	parties	and	
politicians	 in	 the	 state	 under	 consideration	were	 better	 informed	 and	 therefore	more	
trustworthy	in	their	judgments	than	outsiders.	Our	empirical	findings	based	on	a	theo‐
retical	 model	 point	 into	 a	 different	 direction,	 however.	 Insiders	 (in	 state	 politicians,	
members	from	governing	coalition	parties)	are	more	optimistic	than	outsiders	and	are	
likely	to	be	subject	to	an	overconfidence	bias,	which	could	lead	to	too	little	consolidation	
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	 	 Evaluated	states	 	










BB	 53	 5	 68 89	 0	 58 53 11 37 16 32 5 11	 68	 16	 37 35
BE	 13	 33	 70 73	 0	 67 37 30 47 10 23 13 10	 57	 27	 50 35
BW	 5	 0	 75 93	 1	 58 22 16 17 9 19 8 4	 71	 5	 19 26
BY	 3	 3	 57 89	 3	 53 21 4 25 5 17 7 4	 61	 5	 32 24
HB	 11	 0	 67 72	 11	 56 28 28 50 11 28 6 6	 56	 28	 22 30
HE	 10	 2	 56 76	 2	 78 26 18 34 10 16 8 8	 58	 16	 32 28
HH	 21	 8	 72 74	 0	 62 67 31 44 15 36 8 3	 54	 21	 28 34
MV	 6	 0	 72 78	 0	 53 41 83 24 0 12 0 6	 78	 12	 29 31
NI	 4	 0	 74 91	 2	 57 24 19 56 11 26 11 6	 54	 20	 26 30
NW	 6	 4	 67 82	 0	 53 10 24 45 16 29 10 4	 61	 20	 31 29
RP	 14	 0	 76 78	 4	 64 28 20 36 14 52 12 4	 64	 22	 40 33
SH	 10	 7	 65 86	 10	 55 17 24 38 10 21 66 10	 52	 28	 31 33
SL	 20	 5	 95 100	 5	 85 45 20 55 10 35 20 30	 55	 25	 35 40
SN	 11	 0	 67 80	 2	 42 11 29 20 0 13 4 0	 89	 16	 42 27
ST	 24	 3	 76 83	 7	 52 28 45 35 14 28 17 17	 72	 59	 45 38
TH	 22	 11	 67 97	 11	 69 22 31 47 19 33 28 11	 89	 28	 47 40
∅MSP	
∅State	
12	 4	 69 85	 3	 59 27 23 36 10 26 13 7	 65	 19	 33 31
































Tertiary	degree	 0.023 0.006	 0.023	 0.006
[0.035]	 [0.009]	 [0.035]	 [0.010]	
Economics/Business	degree 0.038 0.010	 0.037	 0.010
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 [0.039]	 [0.011]	
Individual:	parliamentary	role 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.127*** 0.034***	 0.106**	 0.029**
[0.046]	 [0.012]	 [0.049]	 [0.013]	
Member	of	budget	committee ‐0.152*** ‐0.041***	 ‐0.149***	 ‐0.041***
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 [0.039]	 [0.011]	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.006*** ‐0.002***	 ‐0.006***	 ‐0.002***
	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	other	 	
Female	 ‐0.105*** ‐0.028***	 ‐0.106***	 ‐0.029***
[0.033]	 [0.009]	 [0.032]	 [0.009]	
Age	in	years	 0.002* 0.001*	 0.002*	 0.001*
[0.001]	 [0.000]	 [0.001]	 [0.000]	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2) 0.063*** 0.017***	 0.062***	 0.017***
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.110 ‐0.030	 ‐0.103	 ‐0.028
[0.068]	 [0.018]	 [0.067]	 [0.018]	
SPD	 ‐0.177** ‐0.048**	 ‐0.167**	 ‐0.046**
	 [0.074]	 [0.020]	 [0.073]	 [0.020]	
Green	Party	 0.047 0.013	 0.046	 0.013
	 [0.088]	 [0.024]	 [0.087]	 [0.024]	
Left	Party	 0.103 0.028	 0.097	 0.026
[0.085]	 [0.023]	 [0.085]	 [0.023]	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.115 ‐0.031	 ‐0.117	 ‐0.032
[0.128]	 [0.034]	 [0.126]	 [0.034]	
State	characteristicsb	 	
GDP	per	capita	(H1)	 0.022*** 0.006***	 0.027***	 0.007***
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	
Total	debt	to	GDP	(H1)	 ‐0.053*** ‐0.014***	 	
	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Average	budget	deficit	over	last	three	years	(H1)	 	 	 ‐0.314***	 ‐0.086***
	 	 	 [0.034]	 [0.009]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 0.896*** 0.241***	 2.581***	 0.706***
	 [0.324]	 [0.087]	 [0.285]	 [0.077]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.100 ‐0.027	 ‐0.734***	 ‐0.201***
[0.117]	 [0.031]	 [0.094]	 [0.025]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 0.148*** 0.040***	 ‐0.315***	 ‐0.086***
	 [0.053]	 [0.014]	 [0.051]	 [0.014]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.145* 0.039*	 0.590***	 0.161***
[0.075]	 [0.020]	 [0.073]	 [0.020]	
Cross	state	dimension	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.627*** 0.169***	 0.731***	 0.200***
	 [0.106]	 [0.028]	 [0.129]	 [0.035]	
Distance	 ‐0.015 ‐0.004	 0.011	 0.003
	 [0.021]	 [0.006]	 [0.025]	 [0.007]	
Adjacency	 0.147** 0.040**	 0.136*	 0.037*
	 [0.073]	 [0.020]	 [0.083]	 [0.023]	































Tertiary	degree	 0.008 0.002	 0.009	 0.002
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 [0.040]	 [0.011]	
Economics/Business	degree 0.077* 0.021*	 0.076*	 0.021*
[0.042]	 [0.012]	 [0.042]	 [0.012]	
Individual:	parliamentary	role 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.138*** 0.038***	 0.140***	 0.039***
[0.047]	 [0.013]	 [0.047]	 [0.013]	
Member	of	budget	committee ‐0.140*** ‐0.039***	 ‐0.140***	 ‐0.039***
[0.041]	 [0.011]	 [0.041]	 [0.011]	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.015*** ‐0.004***	 ‐0.015***	 ‐0.004***
	 [0.003]	 [0.001]	 [0.003]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	other	 	
Female	 ‐0.084** ‐0.023**	 ‐0.084**	 ‐0.023**
[0.036]	 [0.010]	 [0.036]	 [0.010]	
Age	in	years	 0.007*** 0.002***	 0.007***	 0.002***
[0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2) 0.057*** 0.016***	 0.057***	 0.016***
[0.006]	 [0.002]	 [0.006]	 [0.002]	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	
CDU/CSU	 0.000 0.000	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.000
[0.075]	 [0.021]	 [0.075]	 [0.021]	
SPD	 ‐0.125 ‐0.035	 ‐0.126	 ‐0.035
	 [0.082]	 [0.023]	 [0.082]	 [0.023]	
Green	Party	 0.037 0.010	 0.037	 0.010
	 [0.097]	 [0.027]	 [0.097]	 [0.027]	
Left	Party	 0.287*** 0.080***	 0.287***	 0.079***
[0.098]	 [0.027]	 [0.098]	 [0.027]	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.525** ‐0.146***	 ‐0.523**	 ‐0.145**
[0.204]	 [0.057]	 [0.204]	 [0.056]	
State	characteristicsb	 	
GDP	per	capita	(H1)	 0.004 0.001	 0.005	 0.001
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	
Need	for	consolidation		(H1) ‐0.384*** ‐0.107***	 ‐0.393***	 ‐0.109***
	 [0.045]	 [0.012]	 [0.046]	 [0.013]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 1.770*** 0.492***	 1.763***	 0.489***
	 [0.286]	 [0.079]	 [0.284]	 [0.078]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.733*** ‐0.203***	 ‐0.713***	 ‐0.198***
[0.108]	 [0.029]	 [0.112]	 [0.030]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 ‐0.049 ‐0.014	 ‐0.034	 ‐0.009
	 [0.045]	 [0.012]	 [0.044]	 [0.012]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.578*** 0.160***	 0.558***	 0.155***
[0.072]	 [0.019]	 [0.070]	 [0.019]	
Cross	state	dimension	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.816*** 0.227***	 0.747***	 0.207***
	 [0.123]	 [0.034]	 [0.142]	 [0.039]	
Distance	 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.013	 0.003
	 	 	 [0.025]	 [0.007]	
Adjacency	 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.148*	 0.041*
	 	 	 [0.080]	 [0.022]	
Home	state	fixed	effects	   	 
Regression	diagnostics:	 	
Observations	 10,224 10,224
Pseudo‐R2	 0.235 0.243
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	individual	variables 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party‐dummies	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	state	controls	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	cross	state	variables 0.000 0.000
Notes:	*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level;	Standard	errors	in	brackets;	a	base	category	is	the	market	
oriented	liberal	democratic	party	“FDP”;	b	State	characteristics	are	2010	data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	
place	in	2011,	and	2011	data	for	survey	wave	3,	which	took	place	in	2012.	Weighting	based	on	inverse	response	probabil‐
ities	based	on	party	and	state	affiliation.	
